

China in the European Information Space: The War in Ukraine as a Game Changer

Ivana Karásková, Ph.D.











China information operations: modus operandi in Europe before 2019

- China's style was **defensive** focused on attempts to rewrite the discourse towards "positive news" about China and utilize the praise from foreigners to support CCP's image inside China.
 - Ways of operation:
 - investment in traditional media/(co)Ownership MapInfluenCE research showed that when Chinese company buys media outlet, the tone of reporting changes significantly (towards communicating only positive coverage of China) and the focus of media shifts towards China-promoted issues (BRI).
 - inclusion of paid supplements
 - establishment of social media accounts (embassies, diplomats, CRI, Xinhua, etc.)
- using alternative/fringe outlets often spreading pro-Kremlin narratives

 Micros (e.g. local mutations of Sputnik)





- During the Hong Kong protests and after the outbreak of COVID-19 epidemic, China **increased** activity of previously established accounts and channels and employed new tactics:
 - switching from overt to covert: e.g. #Forzaltalia campaign in IT
 - •localizing narratives: e.g. claims of increase of price for 5G networks buildup in case Huawei is excluded from tenders in POL and CZ (based on "independent" analysis which turned out to be paid for by Huawei)
 - •outsourcing propaganda: e.g. CRI cooperating with local fringe radios in the CZ and SER
- financing superitories en g. GRI paid Med SK youth to make supportive load un Bhartas Digitach UCD

CHINA INFORMATION OPERATIONS:



WAR IN UKRAINE



Strhnutí masky supervelmoci: Kde začala ukrajinská krize / Xu Zihe (Sü C'-che), GT





DOMŮ Z ČÍNY ZE SVĚTA Z ČESKA CESTOVÁNÍ KULTURA SPOLEČNOST NÁZORY

Hlas WHO odhalil temné biologické laboratoře Spojených států na Ukrajině!

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CHINA INFORMATION OPERATIONS:



WAR IN UKRAINE

- "no limits partnership" with Russia, including on convergence of narratives in state and social media
- "special military operation" vs. "war"
- CN narratives: special focus on US and NATO war as a result of NATO enlargement, Fort Detrick as the source of COVID-19
- channels: China Radio International and local fringe/alternative media
- confluence: sharing offices and editors (Russia Today & China Today in BG), sharing narratives, sharing sources (increased number of Chinese officials and intellectuals quoted by Russian fringe outlets targeting EU population and vice-versa)
- assessment: despite bans on some Russian media, the Russian narrative spread by channels used by China (CRI), uneasy attribution, outsourcing of content production and sharing to local influencers/media/social media groups











Thank you

ivana.karaskova@fsv.cuni.cz







