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Russian Propaganda and Attacks Against Ukrainian Civilian Infrastructure

Espresso

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Over the decades, a variety of false and misleading narratives have been utilized by the Russian propaganda ecosystem to target both domestic and global audiences. Among many disinformation machines at the Kremlin's disposal, Telegram channels have risen to prominence in recent years and have become the primary source of news about Russia's war against Ukraine for the Russian population. This research looks at the spread of disinformation narratives among popular pro-Kremlin Russian-language Telegram channels following the attacks on residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine committed, or in some cases likely committed, by Russia.[1]

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, established by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, has formally established Russia's responsibility for some of the war crimes, such as the Bucha massacre or the wave of air strikes on Ukraine's energy-related infrastructure starting on October 10, 2022. It provisionally referred to a number of other "indiscriminate" attacks, including the attack on the Mariupol drama theater carried out on March 16, 2022, the attack on the Kramatorsk train station conducted on April 8, 2022, and the attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk executed on June 27, 2022, as "launched or likely launched" by Russia. It also preliminarily associated the attack on a functioning medical facility, in particular – a maternity hospital in Mariupol, conducted on March 9, 2022, to the Russian armed forces' "failure to take precautions". The extensive and often first-hand evidence collected by Bellingcat on the **Kramatorsk**, along with **Human Rights Watch and SITU Research**, and **Kremenchuk** attacks, as well as the Associated Press on the Mariupol **drama theater** and **maternity hospital** attacks, may serve as an initial documented record of Russia's responsibility. Human Rights Watch also reported on **repeated unlawful Russian attacks across populated areas in Kharkiv**, along with **Amnesty International**. Furthermore, it collected several witness statements, photos and videos attesting to Russia's involvement in **the shelling of an evacuation route in Irpin** on March 6, 2022. Other attacks, such as that on **a multi-store residential building in Dnipro** on January 14, 2023, or the one on **a residential building in Uman** on April 28, 2023, were attributed to Russia with reference information from the Ukrainian authorities. While further investigation is needed, Russia's propaganda ecosystem has already honed its skills in denying any Russian responsibility for civilian harm. The way Telegram has been exploited for this purpose is the focus of this report.

The research relies on qualitative content analysis of over a hundred influential pro-Kremlin Russian-language Telegram channels focusing on the war and generally justifying the invasion. Among these channels are war correspondents from state-run outlets and broadcasters, activists from radical right-wing organizations, veterans of the Donbas war, politicians and members of the state Duma, political and military analysts, news outlets, as well as official government channels. What is put under the microscope is the content posted and shared across these channels in regards to a series of major attacks on Ukrainian residential areas or civilian infrastructure. One important caveat is that references to selected Telegram posts presented in this report are for illustrative purposes only and are usually non-exhaustive. The findings reveal the main trends, patterns, and techniques in the spread of Russian disinformation and propaganda. In particular, five key propaganda techniques have been identified

through the analysis of these Telegram channels. Rather than existing in isolation, the techniques described below intertwine with one another, amplifying their impact on the fabrication and manipulation of evidence.

[1] This formulation is borrowed from the [Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine](#) presented at the 52nd session of the UN Human Rights Council, February 27 – March 31, 2023.

1. Disorientation

The first propaganda technique employed by the Kremlin propagandists from state-run outlets and broadcasters, and reinforced by the same content being shared further on Telegram, is disorientation. This technique is characterized by information overload through the dissemination of conflicting information, narratives, and claims. The overwhelming effect of such confusion makes it difficult for the audience to discern the truth and demotivates them from even trying to do so. This is commonly referred to as the “firehose of falsehood”, occurring when a high volume of messages are broadcast repeatedly, rapidly, and continuously over multiple channels.

Information overload is utilized to manipulate the perception of the audience primarily through *causal confusion*, i.e. the deliberate obfuscation or misrepresentation of cause-and-effect relationships. Russian propaganda rarely, if ever, presents Russia as the aggressor and rather generates multiple explanations of why a certain attack was necessary or who else could have likely executed it. For instance, following the attack on the Kremenchuk shopping mall, narratives circulating on Telegram varied from references to collateral damage associated with Russia’s precision strike on a Ukrainian weapons depot with Western arms allegedly located nearby to claims that the shopping mall was non-functioning and utilized by Ukrainian forces for military purposes instead, as well as suggestions that the attack was a deliberate Ukrainian provocation orchestrated to gain more attention from the West. Russian propaganda also disseminated contradicting narratives regarding the corpses scattered throughout the city after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Bucha on March 31, 2022. While one version suggested that the scenes were staged by Ukraine, asserting that the individuals presumed dead were merely actors and referred to by some Telegram channels as “the walking dead” (ходячие мертвецы), another version claimed that the Ukrainian side was responsible for the killings of civilians. There were also two dominant versions concerning the attack on the Mariupol maternity hospital: some of the studied pro-Kremlin Telegram channels insisted that the material circulated by Western media relied on hired actors and fake shootings; others admitted the fact of the attack but accused Western reporters of manipulating evidence in trying to attribute this attack to Russia. The latter version was based on a misleading testimony given by one of the victims after she was evacuated to her hometown in a part of the Donbas controlled by Russian-backed separatists. However, her version of the events apparently contradicts the evidence and claims of other witnesses.

However, the circulation of multiple versions of the same event can also contribute to ontological confusion, i.e., the deliberate distortion of meanings. Efforts to induce such confusion manifest themselves in Russian propaganda, for example, in the form of the deliberate spread of doubt about Ukraine's national identity and historical legitimacy, the distorted perception of Ukraine as the aggressor, as well as the manipulation of historical narratives, promotion of conspiracy theories, and discrediting of democratic values. In relation to the portrayal of Ukraine as the aggressor, some Telegram channels blamed the Ukrainian army for the killings of civilians in Bucha, as already mentioned above, as well as the airstrike on an administration building and residential areas in Kharkiv carried out on March 1, 2022. The latter claim was accompanied by a very popular narrative in the pro-Kremlin segment of Telegram that the Ukrainians are **“firing at themselves” (сами себя обстреливают)**. Russian propagandists also spread the idea of **“the atrocities committed by the Ukrainian Nazis in Mariupol”**. The manipulation of history is evident, for instance, in the references by some pro-Kremlin Telegram channels to “the children of the Donbas” or, sometimes more generally, the “genocide” of Russian(-speaking) people living there, implying the loaded question “Where have you been for 8 years?” This pro-war narrative, invoked, for instance, during the residential building attack in Uman and the October wave of air strikes on critical energy-related infrastructure in major Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, neglects the fact that the intensity of the hostilities in the Donbas had been on the decline by the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Some of the distributed narratives relied on conspiracy theories. One of the most prominent examples concerns the **apparently fabricated** information about US-run biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. Disinformation about the presence of such biolabs in Kharkiv was shared on the eve of Russia's massive airstrikes on the city in early March 2022, possibly to divert attention from the damage or justify the attack.

2. Majority Illusion

The key message consistently spread in the pro-Kremlin segment of Telegram with respect to most of the studied attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential areas is that Russia was not responsible for the damage involved, with the blame persistently shifted, yet in various ways and under various pretexts, to the Ukrainian side. Although the audience is sometimes exposed to different versions of the same event across multiple pro-Kremlin Telegram channels as a part of the disorientation technique, even such diverse and sometimes conflicting narratives are often united by an overarching theme. For example, after the liberation of Bucha by the Ukrainian armed forces and the unveiling of the massive scale of war crimes committed during Russia's occupation of this territory, most of the studied Telegram channels consistently and unanimously called Bucha a **“provocation” (провокация)**, **“dramatization” (инсценировка)** or **“orchestration” (постановка)** by the Ukrainian side, regardless of whether they claimed the corpses **“were brought [from elsewhere] and laid out”** or **imitated for “staged footage”**.

Russian propaganda is also capable of almost completely avoiding the blur caused by the spread of conflicting narratives and strategically delivering a consistent message to the audience. This even more clearly illustrates what we call the propaganda technique of *majority illusion*, aimed at creating the

impression of a consensus and widespread public support. Russian propaganda consistently blamed the Ukrainian armed forces for obstructing the evacuation of civilians, using them as a **“human shield”**, and even shooting them in parts of the city where the Russian army was advancing during the fighting for Irpin in March 2022. However, **whilst the key bridge in the area was indeed destroyed by Ukrainian forces, presumably to halt the Russian advance, Ukrainian soldiers and security forces were, according to some evidence, assisting civilians with evacuation.** Russian propaganda with respect to the strike on the Kramatorsk railway station is yet another example of how it can consolidate, at least in a particular digital space studied here – Telegram, to deliver a single message across the board. The most popular narrative, **debunked** by independent investigators, has been that Russia does not operate Tochka-U missiles, which were used in the strike. Another illustration of the same is the broadly shared understanding that the Mariupol drama theater was bombed in a **“bloody provocation”** by the Azov battalion. Independent Western media preliminarily **refuted** this claim based on the evidence by witnesses and survivors.

The effect of majority illusion as a propaganda technique is also known as the echo chamber effect. The content of the Telegram channels studied here, especially assuming that a good number of users may follow more of them simultaneously, caters primarily to an audience under the influence of Russian propaganda. In this relatively closed system of knowledge circulation, individuals are exposed to a consistent flow of information that aligns with their existing beliefs, further solidifying their perceived credibility of such beliefs and their feeling of belonging to the majority.

3. Transfer of Responsibility

There are three prevalent ways in which Russia has transferred responsibility for the attacks on residential areas and civilian infrastructure from itself to the Ukrainian side. First of all, Russian propaganda has often referred to such attacks as orchestrated by Ukraine. The goal is to show that Ukraine has developed a practice of staged provocations to garner support from the West. This propaganda technique rose to prominence after the Bucha massacre. Relying on **the manipulated evidence of moving corpses and the flawed argument that the way the bodies were lying on the ground looked staged,** pro-Kremlin Telegram channels have collectively generated the impression that the word “Bucha” is synonymous with “orchestration”. Consequently, this reference has become a tool for the discreditation of future incidents as similar staged provocations by Ukraine. For example, one of the many circulating narratives with respect to the attack on the Kremenchuk shopping mall, as also discussed above, was that Ukraine staged this attack – immediately labeled as **“Bucha 2.0”** by Russian propagandists – on the eve of the NATO summit. The strike on the Kramatorsk railway station was also referred to as the **“new”** or **“next”** Bucha. These examples are not exhaustive. Russian propaganda invoked the same narrative in relation to the attack on the Mariupol maternity hospital, similarly calling it both a **“provocation”** and an **“orchestration”**. One of the key versions suggested in the pro-Kremlin segment of Telegram, as also explained above, is that Ukraine hired actors and staged photos of the injured. Some of the studied channels particularly focused on debunking the story of a heavily pregnant woman captured in most of the photographs personifying the horror of this attack. Her identity **has been verified**, however.

Even when the fact of a given attack was acknowledged, Russian propaganda has worked to attribute direct responsibility for this attack to the Ukrainian side. This has been achieved in two ways. First, the damage was sometimes attributed to the workings of Ukrainian air defense systems in shooting down Russian missiles. Such a blame-shifting narrative was invoked in relation to the missile attack that hit a multi-store residential building in Dnipro. In making this claim, Russian propaganda took advantage of the statement of Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych, which was subsequently refuted by the Ukrainian side and withdrawn.. The residential building attack in Uman was also unanimously traced to the workings of Ukrainian air defense systems by pro-Kremlin Telegram channels. An accompanying narrative to the Dnipro strike spread the idea that such tragedies are **“very beneficial”** to the Ukrainian government in making the case for further military support from the West. This illustrates the second prominent way of shifting the responsibility for particular attacks to the Ukrainian side by Russian propagandists. Commenting on the attack in Uman, some pro-Kremlin Telegram channels similarly argued that **“mass tragedies are beneficial to Kyiv ... to increase pressure on the ‘partners’”**. Russian propaganda also shifted the blame for the air raid on Kharkiv in early March 2022 to Ukraine, claiming that it was an attempt by the Ukrainian president to **“make another show”**. As already explained above, Russian propaganda also relied upon flawed evidence while blaming Ukraine for the killing of its own civilians in the attack on the Kramatorsk railway station. This so-called **“provocation”** was portrayed as the **“slaughter” arranged** by the Ukrainian side in light of the visit to Kyiv of representatives of the European Union (EU). Russian propaganda also claimed that the Azov battalion shot dead several senior officers of the Ukrainian armed forces, mined the city and fired tanks at residential buildings in Mariupol. Azov was also accused of blowing up the Mariupol drama theater, with some Telegram channels providing the following explanation: **“For why [all] this has been done, it is impossible to understand inhuman logic”**.

One more way of blame-shifting explored by Russian propagandists is their reliance on the alleged evidence of military use of civilian infrastructure or military objects being placed in close proximity to civilian ones by the Ukrainians. Labelling the Bucha massacre as **“a classic attempt at shifting the blame” by the Ukrainian side, one of the studied Telegram channels accused “Ukronazis” of repeated “inhuman treatment of civilians,” referring, inter alia, to their positioning of “tanks and artillery in the yards” and “firing points on the roofs of residential buildings”**. Following the attack on a residential building in Uman, some pro-Kremlin Telegram channels also accused the Ukrainian armed forces of **“the arrangement of air defense positions in residential areas”**. Russian propaganda also maintained, although inconsistently as discussed above, that it was the fire spread from the Russian attack on a nearby weapons depot with Western arms that caused the destruction of the Kremenchuk shopping mall. Referring to this case, some Telegram channels explicitly speculated that the Ukrainians **“covered”** military facilities with civilian ones. Others contained references to **the allegedly “suspicious” evidence that there were almost no cars at the outdoor parking lot of the shopping mall while “fully equipped” military servants were present** instead, supposedly indicating that the shopping mall was non-functioning at the moment of the attack. Some pro-Kremlin Telegram channels similarly insisted that the Mariupol maternity hospital served as a military base for Ukrainian forces, likely to support their claim that the evidence of Russia’s attack on a functioning medical facility was fabricated or manipulated.

4. Focus-shifting

To divert attention from critical incidents, Russian propaganda often employs focus-shifting techniques. Since the fall of 2022, when Russian border areas came under increasing attack by Ukrainian forces, Russia's acknowledgment of its responsibility for destroying civilian infrastructure in Ukraine has become more explicit. However, attention has consistently been shifted to the *source*, i.e., the supposed pretext for such an attack created by the Ukrainian side. Russia's action has therefore been presented as merely a reaction or payback. A notable example of such a narrative-generating propagandist strategy can be observed in the October wave of air strikes on critical energy-related infrastructure in major Ukrainian cities. Some Telegram channels cheered this action by Russian forces, framing it as a retaliation for **8-month-long attacks on the Donbas and Russian border areas by "Ukronazis", the preceding Ukrainian attack on the Crimean Bridge, and Ukraine's supposed involvement in the assassination of Darya Dugina.**

Another popular technique in Russian propaganda is the shift in focus towards alleged *precedents*. This technique has often been referred to in Western literature and press as "whataboutism". During the war in Ukraine, Russia's whataboutist rhetoric and especially references to the "8 years" of suffering in the Donbas have served to downplay the damage caused by Russian strikes since February 2022. Following the October wave of air strikes on major Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv, some Telegram channels speculated that **the people of Donbas had been experiencing the same for over 8 years.** Various vulnerable groups are frequently exploited for rhetorical manipulations. For example, some pro-Kremlin channels reminded of **"women, children, and elderly" who have been dying in the Donbas at the hands of "Ukronazis" for by then "9 years"** in view of the attack on a residential building in Uman. Russian government officials encourage and participate in the creation of the whataboutist rhetoric. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov immediately tried to shrug off the blame for civilian harm in Ukraine from Russia, insisting **it was not Russia that "invented [the term] collateral damage"** and tracing this expression to the Western campaigns in Iraq and Libya. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs similarly referred to the **"disastrous consequences of US adventurist interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, the bombing of Yugoslavia, and the atrocities in Vietnam"** when addressing outright condemnation from the West of Russia's aggression in Ukraine.

5. Emulation of OSINT

A novel disinformation technique increasingly explored by Russian propaganda is the emulation of open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations. Telegram has come to the forefront as a social media platform well-suited for disseminating the results of such investigations. At the outset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Telegram channel "War on fakes" (*Война с фейками*) assumed a leading role in "debunking fakes" within the Russian-speaking segment of Telegram. Presenting itself as a genuine fact-checking project, "War on fakes" has produced an average of 15-20 posts per day. These posts have acquired widespread popularity among pro-Kremlin Telegram channels in particular as their

content has generally served the purpose of shifting the blame and responsibility for civilian harm in Ukraine away from Russia (Pic. 1).

The “War on fakes” Telegram channel mimics the best practice and work ethic of independent fact-checking projects. Its reliance on the “investigative aesthetic”, in particular visual verification of information through image and video analysis or the use of satellite imagery, has boosted the perceived credibility of “War on fakes”. However, their findings are often biased or manipulated. Their findings are often based on official statements by the Russian Ministry of Defense or information from other pro-Kremlin news sources. For instance, in its effort to disprove the fact of a Russian air strike on the drama theater in Mariupol, “War on fakes” **referred to the pro-Kremlin media outlet “Readovka” and, in a different post published shortly afterwards, to the Ministry of Defence.** To refute the allegations of Russia’s large-scale violence against civilians in Bucha, the channel called them **“a planned media campaign”**. Visual evidence used in support of this claim featured seemingly moving corpses. Independent OSINT analysts immediately **debunked** this version, however, proving that the impression of body movements was caused either by a distortion in the rear-view mirror or a droplet of water on the windshield.

Although the credibility of “War on fakes” has been compromised on countless occasions, with even the Russian Ministry of Defense sometimes refuting their findings, the channel maintains its popular legitimacy at least in part due to the continued support by influential Kremlin propagandists, state institutions and news channels on Telegram.

Concluding Remarks

This research is for anyone trying to get to the bottom of the truth. It takes independent, evidence-based investigations as the starting point and draws attention to the range of propaganda techniques that may be used and have indeed been used by the Russian side following its invasion of Ukraine to disorient and manipulate the audience. Besides fact-checking and investigative efforts, raising public awareness of how propaganda works is an important contribution to media literacy. The data presented in this report should also serve as an alarming reminder that legal responsibility has not yet been formally established for most of the war crimes in Ukraine.

Минобороны России
Forwarded messages

Война с фейками 25.04.22

Фейк: Мирных жителей Бучи убили российские военные, пишет The Guardian. Судмедэкспертиза обнаружила в телах горожан металлические флешетты, которыми начиняют 122-мм снаряды ЗШ1.

Правда: Первая нестыковка, которая ставит под вопрос объективность материала: The Guardian прямо пишет, что артиллерийские удары по Буче наносились в то время, когда она была под контролем РФ. Соответственно, российские войска просто не могли наносить удары по территории, на которой расположены свои же подразделения.

Обстрелы велись 122мм артиллерийскими снарядами ЗШ1, начиненными флешетками – небольшими металлическими «дротиками». Такое оружие использует ВСУ. Военный эксперт **Борис Рожин** отмечает, что 122мм снаряды используются в гаубицах типа Д-30. У ВСУ на начало спецоперации было не менее 350 гаубиц Д-30 и большое количество боеприпасов к ним из арсеналов СССР. «У ВСУ это фактическое основное полевое орудие, в том числе и у 4-й бригады НГУ, которая вела бои за Гостомель, Бучу и Ирпень», - пишет эксперт. Применялись они и при **обстреле Донбасса** в 2014 году.

В РФ такие орудия, в основном, сняты с вооружения и переданы на хранение. Их заменили Мста-Б с другими снарядами и другого калибра – 152 мм

Напомним, мы неоднократно разбирали провокацию, которую украинская сторона устроила в Буче. Подробный материал на эту тему можно прочитать [здесь](#).



СОЛОВЬЁВ
Forwarded messages

Война с фейками 8.04.22

Фейк: Удар по вокзалу Краматорска нанесли российские войска ракетой «Точка-У». Об этом заявил президент Украины Владимир Зеленский.

Правда: Удар был действительно нанесен «Точкой-У», однако эти тактические ракеты используют только ВСУ Украины, и ответственность за данную трагедию лежит на украинских властях. Это подтверждает фото с обломками ракеты, а теперь еще и Зеленский. Ранее украинские телеграм-каналы сообщили, что удар нанесен «Искандером-М», однако эта версия позднее была опровергнута и исключена даже самими украинскими властями.

Российские войска не используют «Точку У» с 2019 года. А вот ВСУ 14 марта нанесли удар именно такой ракетой по Донецку, в результате чего погибли 20 человек.

Ракета, упавшая в Краматорске, была выпущена с юго-запада – эта территория подконтрольна ВСУ. В Минобороны РФ **подчеркивают:** никаких огневых задач 8 апреля в городе Краматорск у российских вооруженных сил не было и не планировалось. А тактические ракеты «Точка-У» применяются только украинскими вооруженными силами.

По результатам анализа повреждений на вокзале в Краматорске можно сделать вывод, что ракета разрушилась в воздухе на финальном участке траектории. С большой долей вероятности можно утверждать, что боевая часть (БЧ) ракеты не работала. Так как при детонации фугасной боевой части на месте падения была бы воронка диаметром в несколько метров, а при использовании кассетной БЧ радиус поражения составил бы около километра, при этом поражение в таком радиусе в Краматорске не наблюдается.

Саморазрушение ракеты могло произойти в результате длительного хранения без должного обслуживания и проведения регламентных процедур.

На вооружении ВСУ находится большое количество старой и устаревшей техники, что приводит к промахам. Например, 4 октября 2001 года украинские военные устроили в Крыму учения войск ПВО с показательными стрельбами из комплексов С-200 и С-300. И в результате **сбили над Черным морем** пассажирский самолет, что привело к гибели 78 человек.

Отметим также, что последнее время Украина предпринимала попытки модернизации своих ракетных сил. Например, у части ракет «Точка-У» проверены и надежные советские системы самоуничтожения были заменены на кустарные собственного производства, что и могло стать причиной трагедии.



Караульный Z
Forwarded messages


Война с фейками 10.03.22

Фейк: Российская авиация нанесла удар по роддому в Мариуполе. Президент Украины Владимир Зеленский назвал это «зверством»: по его словам, под завалами остались женщины и дети.

Правда: Несмотря на то, что информация об ударе появилась вчера в середине дня (на многочисленных видео и фото не было видно ни одного пациента), кадры с беременными женщинами оказались в информационном пространстве **намного позже** – вечером 9 марта. Однако они сразу облетели все информационные площадки и публики, стали распространяться в различных популярных сообществах и у блогеров, что может являться следствием спланированной кампании. И это несмотря на то, что сами **местные жители утверждают**, что в роддоме не было ни роженцев, ни персонала.

История вызывает много вопросов: логично предположить, что если бы там действительно были роженцы, сотрудники службы спасения и очевидцы, прибывшие на место первыми, сразу сделали бы фото с места ЧП на свои телефоны, не дожидаясь известного репортажного фотографа. Однако так получилось, что первым подготовил и опубликовал фотографии известный украинский пропандист **Евгений Малолетка**. Начав свою карьеру в УНИАН, сейчас он сотрудничает с такими медиагруппами, ведущими антироссийскую кампанию годами, как the Guardian, The Times, The NYT. На него подписан даже личный фотограф Барака Обамы, а в 2015 году Малолетка даже **просил стажировку** в престижной программе Eddie Adams Workshop в Нью-Йорке. Любопытно, что этот фотограф рассказывает о «военных преступлениях России» еще с 2014 года.

Сегодня же мы получили неоспоримые подтверждения постановки «кадров с беременными», за которую отвечают украинские пропагандисты и их польские медиаинструкторы, о которых мы писали ранее. Украинцы использовали для самых громких кадров (всего их три) **модель Марианну** из Мариуполя. Любопытно, что она играет сразу двух разных беременных: ей пришлось даже **перекраситься** и переодеться, что, впрочем, не удивительно: ведь на самом деле Марианна **известный в регионе бьюти-блогер**. Хотим отметить, что девушка действительно беременна, но только в роддоме находится никак не могла: учреждение уже несколько дней **использовалось боевиками «Азова»** как укрепленный объект, не функционирующий как медучреждение. Слава уже нашла героиню данной постановки: в ее инстаграме под последним постом уже больше 500 комментариев от реальных пользователей, осуждающих девушку за участие в грязных информационных сбросах.



Роман Бабан
Forwarded messages

Война с фейками 16.03.22

Фейк: Драмтеатр Мариуполя со множеством гражданских внутри атаковала российская авиация.

Правда: После провала провокации в больнице №3 Мариуполя, националисты из «Азова» готовились более тщательно. В театр заглянули много гражданских людей, пообещав им защиту в бомбоубежище. Неудивительно, что произошла утечка информации. 12 и 13 марта были сообщения в **твиттере** и телеграме о том, что «Азов» планирует подорвать здание и **обвинить** в этом российских военных.

Примерно тогда же было снято **видео**, в котором демонстрировались гражданские люди в театре. Интересно, что качество видео – очень плохое. Второе видео сделало Associated Press, которые снимают вполне высокачественные **ролики**. Вероятно, это видео должно показать многочисленных жертв атаки на драмтеатр. Но на 1:33 видно, что в здание пробивается естественный дневной свет, а взрыв в театре произошел после 15:30. Пока туда приехали спасатели, разобрали обломки, доставили жертв в больницу и вызвали оператора должно пройти время – за окном явно были бы сумерки.

Интересно, что герои этого ролика ни разу не говорят о «русской» или «российской» атаке. При этом в субтитрах на английском языке упоминается Russian shelling – то есть обстрел русскими. В тоже время, в конце ролика женщина **говорит прямо** про «Геноцид».

Наконец, на **видеоаудиос** диалогов с очевидцами отчетливо слышно, что российские самолеты летают, но не атакуют гражданские объекты в Мариуполе. На видео (1:30) на вопрос, где украинские боевики ставили танки, женщина отвечает: **«...перед бомбоубежищами. Отсюда, Драмтеатр разбит, просто отсюда, просто просто, людей к нам привезли с осколками, и всё...»**

Есть и другая важная информация в видеоаудиос:

- Украинская армия никак не помогла мирным жителям.
- ВСУ размещали бронетехнику в непосредственной близости от гражданских бомбоубежищ.
- Все пытавшиеся покинуть город через «гуманитарные коридоры» были убиты на выезде из Мариуполя.
- Российские военные поставились обеспечить бегущим всем необходимым.

Ранее, Минобороны официально **опровергло** информацию об атаке на Драмтеатр города и сообщило, что боевики националистического батальона «Азов» совершили новую кровавую провокацию, взорвав заминированное ими здание театра.



Fig. 1. Illustrations of high-profile reposts from the Telegram channel “War on fakes”