



Central European
Digital Media
Observatory



Unconventional Forms of Civil Participation in Defence: Preliminary observations from Russo- Ukrainian War

Espresso

Matej Kandrik, Tadeas Pala

The landscape of international relations, security, and strategic studies has evolved substantially since the Cold War era, demanding new ways of thinking and understanding. While there is a substantial body of literature on so-called new wars, rise of non-state actors and their role in emerging modes of contemporary warfare, most of those contributions are written from an adversarial perspective and based on observations from chronic conflict zones and outright failed states. It covers Western experience from expeditionary missions, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and other military operations than war since the end of the Cold War. Yet, the case of Ukraine is suggesting that sweeping technological development, societal shifts and information revolution are significantly transforming conventional “state on state” armed conflict. In this policy paper we argue that these changes created space for unconventional forms of civic participation in defence, which might generate considerable contributions to the war effort itself. To unlock and utilise the full potential of the “*whole of the society*” or “*comprehensive defence*” concepts applications, it is necessary to observe and analyse real world cases and use conclusions to rethink how we perceive the role of individuals, communities and society in participating in security and defence.

Main Preliminary Observations

All presented and discussed examples are based on personal experiences and observations of individuals, who spent considerable amounts of time in Ukraine in recent years. Also, we use open source information, media and research done by other organisations. Cases and examples of direct combat roles are not discussed, we focus strictly on civilian, non-combat, support forms of participation even if in some cases the dividing lines are blurry.

The first major general observation from the war is the scope and intensity of international involvement. Individuals, informal networks, civil society organisations and members of diaspora abroad are heavily invested in supporting Ukraine’s war effort hand in hand with providing humanitarian relief and helping refugees in their respective countries. From fundraising activities delivering financial donations or supporting acquisition and delivery of material to Ukraine and civic demonstrations, happenings or online activism, it is clear that the international dimension is present in various areas of civic participation in defence of Ukraine. Often the Ukrainian diaspora is heavily involved and able to facilitate important contacts inside their country of residence, be it for Ukrainian officials, or representatives of different Ukrainian units and organisations. The informal contacts occasionally lead to European communities supporting “their” Ukrainian unit or organisation, developing almost a “fandom” or “adoption” effect.

The second major general observation is that observed civil participation generates effects mostly in two major categories. It is either logistics multiplier/enabler effect or commitment reproduction. Logistic multiplier or enabler effect is based on fundraising and acquisition of mobility (constant and seemingly insatiable need for trucks, pick-ups, ambulances but also personal cars), technical equipment (drones, 3D printers, laptops, nightvision devices, thermo-vision gear etc.), medical equipment (first aid kits, tourniquets, medicines etc.) or anything else needed at the specific moment. Materiel is distributed both to the frontlines and to the rear via international and local volunteer networks cooperating closely with Armed Forces, National Guard, Territorial Forces and other armed security formations of Ukraine. Aside from direct logistical support to fighting forces,

considerable help is flowing as humanitarian relief and as support for continuation of critical services and functions of the government.

As commitment reproduction, the authors observe activities following two major goals. First, it is keeping the spirit and morale of Ukrainian audiences high. Second, it is keeping the willingness, strength of commitment and cohesion of foreign audiences high. Essentially it is "*Ukraine fatigue*" prevention and mitigation. It is a very broad and heterogeneous category, including offline (happenings, concerts, demonstrations etc.) and online actions (translations from Ukrainian or Russian language, subbing videos, memes production, information dissemination, campaigns supporting fundraisings etc.). One well known example would be NAFO, an international, online, social networks movement using memes to counter Russian propaganda and support the Ukrainian cause. While most activities are genuine grassroot efforts by individual activists and NGOs, some are able to connect to institutional funding from international organisations, foundations and other stakeholders offering grant schemes.

The third major general observation is that aside from the above described categories, which dominate the spectrum of unconventional forms of civil participation, there are also others, which might be very limited in scope or quantity but are filling unexpected niches and providing important capabilities. Selected cases such as paramedics, evacuation service, open source intelligence or the so called "aerorozvidka" will be discussed in detail in following sections.

Militias, Partisans, Protesters

A phenomenon worthy of attention in the context of the Ukrainian conflict is the civilian militia. Especially in the initial stages of the war, these groups of civilians with weapons had a significant influence on maintaining order in the country and in some cases even participated in combat activities. Practically every village and town in the rough vicinity of 100 km from the supposed movement of Russian troops was protected by several checkpoints, at the entrance and exit. These improvised roadblocks were not always staffed by police and soldiers, but by local armed civilians - hunters, gun owners, and other volunteers. Using their knowledge of the local countryside, they performed control checks of every car and searched the surrounding countryside for subversive or stray groups of Russian soldiers. Many "Teraoborona" (Territorial Defense Forces - TDF) units also clashed with the occupying forces. Especially in places where the regular Ukrainian army did not arrive or could not consolidate. On some battlefields, the militia formed in this way also recorded greater military successes, such as captured or destroyed tanks and other heavy machinery. Likewise, in some places, TDF also experienced considerable loss of life. In larger cities, especially in besieged Kiev, similarly formed TDF groups were given light weapons and their activities consisted of protecting strategic places, actively searching for enemy agents and looters and at the point of contact with the enemy, putting up armed resistance. To a large extent, these were informal structures, built on personal acquaintances and contacts. An important factor was the acceptance and collaboration with the local civilian population. Many civilian volunteers took an active part in quickly arming and equipping the TDF units, whether in the form of acquiring cars, making Molotov cocktails, bulletproof vests, or simply food and gas distribution. TDF's existence and origin were mostly natural, but not entirely. These units were often created on the personal initiative of war veterans who had been preparing for several months for potential aggression from Russia. At the turn of 2021 and 2022, also the Ukrainian government initiated the creation of a formal militia, or its personnel backbone. During the first 2 weeks of the war, over 100,000 volunteers volunteered for the TDF units. Later, after the collapse of the siege of Kiev and a certain stabilisation of the conflict, members of the TDF became regular members of the army, who were transferred to the front to the south and east. Some units have retained their status and continue to fight under the TDF flag.

In addition to the armed resistance of the TDF and similar partisan movement, the unarmed protest of the civilians of the occupied cities is also worth mentioning. A good example is Kherson, where Ukrainian civil society put up unarmed resistance for several weeks, blocked roads, boycotted the distribution of "occupation humanitarian aid". They were often not afraid to stand up to armed threats, shooting into the air and sometimes into the crowd. The Russian occupation forces were clearly taken aback by this behaviour, especially in the Russian-speaking regions, and were unable to respond adequately in the first days. Even this form of active unarmed resistance should be seen as significant and heroic, especially in the context of the fact that it did not rely on any armed component or support, given that the Ukrainian police fled and the army withdrew. Many of those protesting in the following months paid a high price for their loyalty to the country and participation in the resistance.

Lesson learned:

Ukraine was lucky in this regard. The large number of veterans and experienced soldiers who took part in the fighting since 2014 ensured that there was a sufficient number of battle ready people among the civilian population. Likewise, the first laws on the foundations of national resistance have already gone through the approval process. Ideally, however, these structures should be prepared and especially equipped much earlier. Lessons for other countries may lie in systematic work with veterans, involvement of civic associations, hunters, volunteer firefighters and others. These structures could then function as a personnel resource or armed support for the regular army in the event of an armed conflict.

Paramedics and Hospitaliers

In the Ukrainian conflict we can come across various groups of volunteers amongst which the paramedics are one of the most prominent. Even before the escalation of the conflict in February 2022, there was a significant movement of paramilitary medics. The most renowned example is the so-called "Hospitaliers". This group consisted of patriotic, sometimes even nationalistic medics, nurses, doctors and trained volunteers, who were providing first aid and field medicine to soldiers and other combatants. Their groups were not subordinated to Army command, but they were cooperating. There is multiple evidence of Hospitaliers working with other volunteer militant groups, namely the "Right sector", "Ukraine Volunteer Army" (UDA) or "Ukrainian Volunteer Corps" (DUK). They shared similar motivations, modus operandi and eventually the locations of deployment. Also the reserved relations with official Army representatives were justified by emphasis on independence. They valued independence so highly, so that they were ready to dispense with all the benefits of being part of the official military, such as salary, equipment, transport, etc. They depended on their own resources and fundraising. Operating under constant shortage of funds, they were forced to seek support from members, donors and foreign sponsors.

Their operational status remains the same today. Even as the war continues, Hospitaliers and similar groups of volunteers are not being paid by the Army. Of course, some of the experienced members were mobilised or left the military as volunteers. However, ambulances of Hospitaliers are still a common sight in the warzone. After interviews with Army doctors, we can state that these groups still work independently and voluntarily. Nowadays, they most often set their base near some fighting unit and after dealing with a local officer, they provide his unit with essential first aid and transport. They are highly motivated volunteers, very often female nurses. Their work is highly valued and despite their "grey" legal status; Hospitaliers should be considered an important asset in this war.

Many foreign volunteers participate in the Ukrainian conflict in a similar manner. Their presence and activities are even more unclear than those of local volunteers. Foreign paramedics are quite often highly trained professionals with paramedic or military background. There are many experienced volunteers who fought in other conflicts on the side of the “free-world” (colloquialism occasionally used by these volunteers when asked about their motivation) - for example against the Islamic state (ISIS) or along Syrian Kurds. However, the majority of foreign paramedic volunteers are experiencing war for the first time.

Motivation of foreign volunteers differs. Some are escaping the simple boredom of living in comfort and want to prove something to themselves or someone else. Others have ideological reasons. Most of them wish to apply their skills in “something that matters” - their life has a purpose deficit and they miss belonging to something greater than themselves (an outcome of growing individualism in western societies). In most cases, feelings of moral outrage forces them to answer calls for help from a country that has been invaded by a stronger aggressor. Part of the feeling is the fact that the Ukrainian war is massively covered in the media for European populations and generates the feeling that it is uncomfortably close to home. Since the situation in the beginning of the war was quite chaotic, many volunteers were not able to join the military from the start, so in many cases they served as medicine suppliers, “consultants” and first aid trainers. Later on, they established connections with military officers, and started to operate in the field. The standard modus operandi is that these groups embed with some army unit(s) and provide them with first aid and basic field medicine in their improvised dressing stations.

Another example may be the medevac and casevac services. These services consist of extraction of wounded soldiers, and then evacuation to the closest hospital or another medical point, while under medical observation on the way. These activities can be very extreme, and are equal to fighting on the frontline, in matters of danger. There is no common practice, when it comes to material support. Some groups are equipped by their sponsors from abroad, some partially by the Ukrainian army. Some carry weapons; there are documented cases of foreign paramedics being equipped with guns and rifles, but it is not a rule. The closer to the frontline, the higher the probability. The question of salary is unclear. Some may be funded in a similar way as Ukrainian soldiers, some use crowdfunding, some declare no funding. The difference often lies in the level of independence. Groups that technically entered the army may be funded, others are quite vocal about having their own resources. At the beginning of the conflict, the recruitment of those groups was very improvised and precipitous. These groups either formed around charismatic individuals or were already formed in some previous conflict. In the later phase of the conflict most groups created a strict recruitment system to avoid unskilled or problematic individuals.

Lesson learned:

Armed forces of any self-confident state that takes its security seriously should think how to be ready to integrate such a valuable defensive resource as high-skilled volunteer groups within its ranks in case of an enemy attack. The most vital is a sufficient number of skilled officers being able to communicate in foreign languages and having basic soft skills. Civilians may fit into military units, but one must understand that the mentalities are different. Regarding language skills, English is the most valuable, since it is universal. The ability to support, equip or fund these groups may also be taken into consideration in future defence planning.

Armed forces need to learn how to manage an environment in which valuable independent or semi-independent actors operate, rather than to attempt to control them. Trying to limit their freedom may diminish their motivation or usefulness, and some groups flat-out refuse to be controlled. That may be a challenge for

traditional military doctrines, but the Ukrainian military found a way to coexist with these groups, and the benefits are massive. Including volunteer groups into defence planning opens the opportunity to use skilled local same as foreign personnel that are highly motivated and quickly deployable. Having national or international groups at the disposal of defence proves to be quite convenient. National groups, in peacetime, can take part in first-aid education and know-how sharing with both military and civilian professionals.

Evacuations

Another good example of civilian volunteer involvement is evacuations. From the practice observed especially in the Donbas region, it is evident that a large part, if not the majority, of all evacuations of the civilian population from frontline cities were carried out by volunteers and non-governmental organisations. In this respect, it is truly a unique matter, when almost an entire segment of activities typically falling under the security forces was transferred from state authorities to volunteers. Immediately after the invasion, many initiatives were created, when local organisations or businesses with logistical and transport capabilities began spontaneously evacuating people from bombarded areas. This practice did not change much throughout the duration of the conflict, even after the main refugee waves ended and the evacuation became more geographically focused. Even in summer 2023, most civilians are being extracted by teams of volunteers. These teams differ in the level of skills and organisation. Some have established logistics structures, call centres, translation points and destination stations (i.e. Save Ukraine, Angels of Redemption, Vostok SOS). Others operate very haphazardly and often spontaneously "collect people" on the streets of shelled cities. The level of risk these volunteers take also varies. More organised teams usually have some mechanisms and planning in place. The "less organised" teams of volunteers go out into the field and work often in the so-called form of "reconnaissance by combat". Their knowledge of the actual situation may be limited and based only on their previous experience, intuition and some rumours from soldiers. In the case of the Ukrainian conflict, there is some sense of incredulity that government structures accepted this setup and found it rather convenient. There are, of course, exceptions, such as the "White Angels" police group, which also have evacuation in the job description. It is also worth noting that foreign volunteers participate in a significant part of these activities, either acting on their own, forming expat groups or joining already existing Ukrainian organisations.

The presence of foreigners has its positives and negatives. The advantage is their financial possibilities, ability to crowdfund and often independence and equipment - especially cars. They are also often recruited from among professionals, or just highly motivated amateurs, who usually tend to look for more extreme tasks. But this can also be very problematic, given the lack of orientation in the field, language and civilizational barriers. A sad example can be the case of two volunteers from Britain who were killed during the sudden offensive in Soledar. Their high motivation and heroism could not balance the objective risk. The fact that none of them knew Russian or Ukrainian and they acted on their own, so to speak, significantly worsened their chances. The situation was extremely unclear, and the Wagner group mercenaries managed to capture positions that the Ukrainian army had held firmly for several months in the space of a few days. In the case of better cooperation and organisation of evacuations by the state, such situations would occur less often.

Lesson learned:

The presence of "evacuation" volunteers, who do not participate in the fighting, but often go to the places of ongoing fighting, is again a novelty introduced by the Ukrainian war. It is likely that this will occur in other conflicts. The recommendation for government structures is to prepare for this phenomenon. From the experience of Ukraine, it is possible to see that the sluggish approach of the state can lead to a foggy and

chaotic situation, which is inefficient in many ways. At the same time, this is a great opportunity when the state can leave part of this extremely dangerous and demanding work to the non-governmental sector. It would be responsible to create rules and a framework in which such volunteers could possibly act and contribute to the safety of the population. Coordinated efforts in between designated officers and well-organised NGOs can facilitate the work of the armed forces. The army could transfer the burden of physical evacuation to non-military players in case of good cooperation with NGOs. At the same time, the evacuation of civilians unties hands in case of military intervention and deployment of heavy equipment. This is a good example of outsourcing where the armed forces provide protection and lend a mandate while NGOs do the actual work. The creation of liaison officer positions and state-organised call centres could create a highly effective synergy.

Supply and logistics

Based on interviews with soldiers at the frontline, we can claim that the state-organised supply chain works to a limited extent. Ukraine benefits from the fact that its supply lines are very accessible, given that the war is being fought on its territory. Soldiers can, if necessary, order the needed item via the Internet in standard e-shops and they will get their delivery to towns approximately 10-20 km behind the front itself. State supply is understandably very much influenced by bureaucracy and in many cases inefficient, but ammunition, diesel, food rations and basic war necessities are well(?) distributed. However, a large number of other personal items, such as dual use technology (night vision devices, cars, radio stations) or medical supplies are taken care of by a large number of volunteers who personally deliver them to the soldiers. The impact of volunteer help is difficult to quantify but it is an important way of supply. It ranges from food delivery and trench candles to highly specialised technology, such as drones, power sources or night vision devices. There is a constant shortage of these specialised items, mainly due to intense use and high consumption. This is the first major conflict where drones became consumable. But it is this difference in technological factor that makes the Ukrainian armed forces superior to the Russian ones, despite the disadvantage in numbers and ammunition. Soldiers combine the help of volunteers with their own funding. By Ukrainian standards, fighting soldiers in particular have very high salaries (up to 100,000 UAH). Ukrainian units often put part of their salaries into their equipment and with the help of volunteers procure cars, Starlink antennas, and other equipment mentioned above. The official way to obtain or replenish such funds is often complex, bureaucratic and lengthy. For most soldiers, however, these means are a matter of survival and therefore they acquire them with the help of volunteers, often paying for them themselves. Thousands of crowdfunding campaigns for the purchase of various necessities are running on social networks in Ukraine and abroad. This network often includes family members - women and men beyond the military age (60+) who can go abroad and buy and transport scarce materials in Ukraine (especially cars). Still sometimes, the volunteers refer to complications and abuse at the border crossings.

Lesson learned:

Probably no country, especially in a state of "deep peace", is able to maintain its military logistics chains in a completely ideal state. All the more so for Ukraine, which is in a conflict of high intensity and still suffers from a high level of corruption, bureaucracy and post-Soviet ossification. Even so, we can observe some good working, provisional mechanisms that can make a difference in the context of the fight against the stronger Russian army. The main advantage is that even low rank foot soldiers are decently paid and can afford to collectively buy the necessary hi-tech tools (which have become very consumable) from their wages through and with support of a network of domestic and foreign volunteers. Of course, this would not be possible without massive foreign

subsidies to the Ukrainian state. What could make this mechanism even more effective is the elimination of complications when importing cars and other tools from abroad, where, quite illogically, volunteers can run into many barriers of martial law and bureaucracy

Open Source intelligence, Geolocations and Target Acquisition

Numerous individuals, volunteers, loosely connected networks and private companies are using open source intelligence (OSINT) and social networks intelligence (SOCMINT) tools with a great commitment to reproduction effect. Maxar satellite imagery supported and corroborated with on-site videos and images from social networks fully exposed the atrocities committed by the Russian occupation forces in Bucha, triggering a powerful message, which fomented Western commitment to support Ukraine. There are more cases, when OSINT investigations collected important eye witness accounts, video and audio recordings, photographs or social media posts as evidence of war crimes, atrocities but also damage to cultural heritage and environment. Aside from immediate informational effect, some of these materials might be used in ongoing and future criminal investigations by Ukraine, International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine or other stakeholders. OSINT powered online maps such as DeepStateMap.live, Alerts.in.ua or Liveuamap became popular and often used go-to-source for international media, analysts and researchers. There are also many individuals and groups, which focus or specialise on specific issues such as tracking flight radars, deployed weapons systems, movement of grain or geolocating photos and videos. Their effort contributes greatly to Ukraine's successful competition in narratives about the war vis a vis Russian propaganda.

Apart from the use of OSINT generated information for psychological effect, there is also more direct use of this expertise - it is used by the Ukrainian military for target acquisition. Research done by Matthew Ford from Swedish Defence University shows how OSINT products are being integrated by Ukrainians into identification, localisation of Russian troops presence with consequent strikes against them. Several similar cases were covered by the media and it is a reasonable assumption that there are many cases which never got reported. Sympathetic populations equipped with smartphones are leveraged as sensor multipliers since their environment maintains high connectivity, which in the Ukrainian case is upheld by Elon Musk's Starlink devices.

Lessons Learned:

International OSINT community presents an interesting phenomena, which presence and impact on armed conflict will likely grow. OSINT generated information is able to deliver psychological effects in the information dimension or support kinetic effects on the battlefield. To exploit its potential fully we need better insight into evolving Ukrainian practices on how they collect, corroborate and integrate OSINT into the decision-making cycle, which for understandable reasons is a sensitive topic not suitable for public debate. Further research should also explore the need to adjust our own OPSEC policies to mitigate potential adverse effects on our forces, as OSINT is to a large degree feeding on mistakes, ignorance or incompetence to cover the digital footprint from the adversary.

Drones, Cyber and Netcentric Capabilities

A peculiar case of unconventional forms of civil participation in defence is the Aerorozvidka. Established in 2014 by a group of IT and tech enthusiasts within the community that formed several volunteer battalions with no

official status, they brought their drones to the frontlines. With organic involvement of aircraft modelling clubs, amateur fans and private companies Aerorozvidka started to deliver specific aerial reconnaissance capabilities to the Armed Forces, National Guard and Border Guards. In 2014 this capability was virtually non-existent in professional armed services of Ukraine. Part of Aerorozvidka was later adopted by the MoD and a specialised unit in the Armed Forces was created in its image. In 2020, Aerorozvidka was registered as an NGO and in 2021/2022 part of its members created the Center for Innovations and Development of Defense Technologies.

As noticed by The Defence Post, Aerorozvidka's drone program shined a light on a command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) void in Ukraine's military; it now has this newly-institutionalised capability, but limited ways to exploit the information to best support the military and civil defence forces. Later the same community participated in building a software where the videos and photos taken from drones and other sensors could be geo-referenced via a datalink from the aircraft to the computer, to enhance situational-awareness. Aerorozvidka also took place in development of the Delta System, which is a cloud-based situational-awareness and battle management system developed in Ukraine. It is not an overestimation to say that Aerorozvidka built foundations of Ukrainian drone warfare, which since the Russian invasion in 2022 rose to a strategic importance. Aerorozvidka also provides cyber resilience training and education, drone pilots and instructors certification and it contributes to development of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities of Ukraine.

Lessons Learned:

The case of Aerorozvidka is illustrative in several ways. First, it clearly shows civilians are able to generate niche and highly valuable capabilities with direct military use. Even more, Aerorozvidka was able to pioneer whole new fields and offer unprecedented levels of innovation. Second, the Ukrainian state, MoD, Armed Forces and other stakeholders proven to be adaptative enough to successfully harness this potential. Necessarily, key individuals and groups were absorbed into official structures and underwent a "formalisation", which arguably increased the compatibility of civilian volunteers with professional military and state bureaucracy. But a large part of its members were not, and they continue to work semi-independently and create a kind of hub that absorbs other fans and volunteers and is able to crowdfund and variously support the more formalised structure - taking the best from both military and civilian worlds.

Conclusions and Discussion

The Russia-Ukraine war is a natural experiment and a powerful case study for research on unconventional forms of civil participation in defence. As a still evolving and dynamic case we argue for caution for drawing any lessons learned yet. One of the central issues is to quantify or measure these forms as data are often either non-existent or classified. Available open source information is valuable but it has to be taken with a grain of salt as much of it is part of commitment reproduction activity (i.e. morale boosting and propaganda efforts).

Generally speaking we see civilian participation in all three main forms, being direct armed participation, direct unarmed participation and passive but supportive participation. Direct armed participation is best shown on the influx of domestic and foreign volunteers joining various security forces of Ukraine. We didn't discuss those as we don't see as unconventional per se but they certainly present a bulk of civilian armed participation. Within the scope of this policy paper it would be Aerorozvidka as representative of this particular category. As direct unarmed participation, we consider all forms of activities, which can be directly connected to war effort.

From discussed material, these are paramedic, supply and logistics, active fundraising and part of OSINT activities. Creating information campaigns, participating in demonstrations, creating memes and other kinds of information based efforts we consider as unarmed but active participation as well. All civilians that either because of their role (taking care of their families) or by choice do not participate in the war effort actively, but support it verbally and are willing to bare the hardships of war (i.e. food and energy rationing, following the martial law rules, hiding in shelters) we consider passive but supporting participants. Especially the first two active categories have a strong international dimension and participation runs far beyond just Ukrainian citizens.

An important lesson for other countries, especially for NATO members, is to absorb the Ukrainian experience of cooperation with volunteers. The globalisation of the world takes the exclusive right to mandate violence from the hands of the armed forces of the state and grants part of it to civilians - volunteers. They can be recruited from both local residents and foreigners. For a self-confident state, this fact must be perceived as an opportunity and it must properly prepare for it. A well-designed framework for incorporating volunteer efforts can make the armed forces' jobs much easier and create previously unthinkable synergies. In the same way, foreign ties can be strengthened and the positive image of the war effort generally increased.

Technological innovations widened the opportunities for civilians to effectively participate in defence. One can meaningfully participate from one's home thousands of kilometres from frontlines. One doesn't even have to be a citizen or speak the language of the country one is supporting. Even if we cannot fully quantify the effects of civic participation its impact is hard to question. Mobilisation of individuals, communities and society conceptualised in this paper as "civil participation" seems to be an important pillar supporting the overall war effort of Ukraine.

