Scroll Top

EDMO study: Main actors of information manipulation in the European Union

rakosnicek_A_small_group_of_people_reading_newspaper_in_a_caf_9765d413-d359-40b9-aae4-a50769b670c5_2

Various types of information manipulation are not only spread in individual European Union (EU) member states by undemocratic regimes (e.g., Russia) in an effort to influence the local population. They are used as a tool to achieve their own goals (e.g., ideological or economic) by Western politicians, so-called alternative media, but also by established media. Take a look at a brief overview of the actors in EU countries who use information manipulation, led by disinformation.

A study by the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) regional hubs focused on seven main actors in the spread of disinformation and their activities across all EU countries. The actors can be divided into: 1) domestic actors, 2) foreign actors, 3) actors providing transmission from other countries, 4) states, 5) politicians, 6) mainstream media, 7) fringe media.

 

Domestic actors

Different types of information manipulation cannot be perceived solely as the product of foreign entities. According to the EDMO study, domestic actors play a role in spreading disinformation in every country surveyed. These include conspiracy theorists, various extremist groups, popular influencers, and individuals on social media. These actors form a functional ecosystem for spreading similar types of information manipulation.

 

Foreign actors

The EDMO study classifies mainly coordinated information attacks on individual EU member states in this category. In the context of Central Europe, this includes, for example, an extensive network called Pravda, which our colleagues at GLOBSEC have examined in more detail. The study also recorded a high percentage of attacks in Poland, Germany, and France.

A significant number of attacks originated in Russia and Belarus, but China is also active in this field. For example, in 2024, the CitizenLab project uncovered a Chinese operation called “Paperwall,” which created more than 120 fake media outlets in the EU. Other actors include countries such as Iran and Serbia.

The spread of various types of information manipulation is influenced by “spillover” from neighboring countries. This is particularly true when these countries speak similar languages. The study noted such spillover effects in Slovenia and Croatia, for example, or in Belgium and Luxembourg.

 

States

There are also cases of state-spread disinformation within the EU. This is particularly true when public and state institutions are subjugated by powerful politically motivated groups. Hungary is a good example of this.

Politicians themselves also feature in the aforementioned state context. The EDMO study uses the example of contemporary Slovakia to show how disinformation, with the help of prominent politicians, moves from the margins directly to the center of public debate. However, this is not unique to Slovakia; similar examples can be found in Portugal, Finland, Germany, Slovenia, and elsewhere.

 

Media (mainstream and so-called fringe)

The role of mainstream traditional media in the context of information manipulation is not always clear. However, many spread disinformation. Titles such as Kronen Zeitung in Austria are examples of these practices.

The EDMO study also highlights that fact-checkers regularly find disinformation on the most popular websites in Greece. This is particularly true for topics related to LGBTQ+ issues and migration, which are often covered in mainstream media.

On the other side of the coin are so-called fringe media, which in some cases are linked to people spreading conspiracy theories or representatives of extremist political parties. Examples include the website AUF1 and the regional television station RTV in Austria.

 

If you are interested in more details, read the complete EDMO study, to which researchers Jana Soukupová from the Center for Law, Technology, and Digitalization at Charles University’s Faculty of Law and Beáta Gavurová from Charles University’s First Faculty of Medicine contributed on behalf of the CEDMO regional hub.

 


*This article has received funding from the European Union under the call: DIGITAL-2023-DEPLOY-04, project 101158609.

Privacy Preferences
When you visit our website, it may store information through your browser from specific services, usually in form of cookies. Here you can change your privacy preferences. Please note that blocking some types of cookies may impact your experience on our website and the services we offer.